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1. Introduction 
Joe Stiglitz has recently been very active in questioning standard 
approaches to policy making such as the "Washington  Consensus" 
and thinking about alternatives to it (Stiglitz, April 1998; 
October 1998). We think it is fair to say that his critiques have 
stimulated valuable controversy and debate. Prestigious economists 
have weighed in on both sides of the debate. The reader will find 
much discussion of this issue in a few minutes of search on the 
Internet. Joe's paper (Stiglitz, April 1998) examines financial 
instabilities and the role played by incomplete and imperfect 
capital markets during financial liberalizations. Economists argue 
vigorously about the relative roles played by market imperfections 
and government imperfections in causing financial instabilities. 
Joe's Prebisch Lecture (Stiglitz, October 1998) goes further and 
not only challenges much of conventional development policy but 
also proposes rather major modifications. One analytical and 
potentially econometrically tractable way of thinking about such 
disputes is to use concepts of scientific model uncertainty.   
     An intelligent policy maker might operate in the face of 
scientific model uncertainty by using concepts from econometrics 
like Bayesian Model Averaging coupled with recent advances in 
decision theory such as modelling "Knightian Uncertainty". This 
approach was taken by Brock and Durlauf (2001) in an attempt to 
constructively critique policy applications of empirical growth   2
analysis and to suggest a modified approach that is still 
empirically disciplined. The idea is to first objectively 
represent the amount of scientific uncertainty in what we can 
learn from empirical exercises when there are levels of 
uncertainty present such as theory uncertainty and model 
uncertainty above and beyond the usual sampling uncertainty in 
parameter estimates for a given model.  This "true" amount of 
uncertainty is typically larger than representations of 
uncertainty in conventional econometric studies.  Second, given 
levels of uncertainty that must be faced by the policy maker, the 
policy maker  should indulge in "robust" policy making that 
appropriately makes some attempt to hedge against worst cases as 
well as maximize the usual estimated net benefit.  
     In this paper we illustrate how the conceptualization of 
Knightian Uncertainty can be applied to the classic problem of 
regulating human impacted ecosystems and how it can lead to a type 
of precautionary principle.  Joe has written extensively in the 
environmental area.  For example, we believe that a version of 
Joe's pair of classical papers on growth and exhaustible resources 
(Stiglitz  (1974a,b)) could be extended to include stochastic 
shocks and model uncertainty about the impact of human activities 
upon the regenerative power of the ecosystem as well as 
uncertainty about the elasticity of substitution between ecosystem 
inputs and human produced inputs into the economic process. In 
such an extension of Joe's work, one could develop a policy 
analysis framework under Knightian Uncertainty which could lead to 
potentially useful conceptions of macrogrowth precautionary   3
principles as well as useful insights into the interaction among 
uncertainties in different parts of the system.   
     An example of what this approach might look like is Pizer 
(1996), except that we would add uncertainty about the elasticity 
of substitution between inputs and, especially, nonlinear 
regeneration dynamics for the ecosystem which allow multiple 
stable states for appropriate parameter values. In this way 
Pizer's Bayesian analysis would allow data to speak to these 
uncertainties as well as the uncertainties that he models.  We 
believe this kind of analysis would help explain which 
uncertainties matter the most and how scientific resources should 
be allocated across attempts to reduce uncertainties. Our current 
paper makes a very modest start on this challenging project by 
considering optimal management of a human impacted ecosystem under 
deterministic nonlinear ecosystem dynamics under Knightian 
Uncertainty. 
The analysis of dynamic environmental systems where the 
accumulation of pollutants cause environmental damages, such as 
phosphorus in a lake, greenhouse gasses in the atmosphere, or acid 
deposit in soils, has received extensive attention in the 
literature of environmental and resource economics.
3 In these 
environmental problems many agents (e.g. countries, firms, 
farmers) contribute through their individual actions (e.g. 
emissions) to the accumulation of the pollutant stock, and the 
damages caused by the pollutant have global characteristics; that 
is, they affect all agents involved in the problem. In the 
analysis of environmental systems with the above characteristics,   4
the natural system is described by linear, in most cases, or 
nonlinear transition equations describing pollutant accumulation. 
Uncertainty has also been introduced into this framework by 
modeling the natural system through Ito stochastic differential 
equations and application of the expected utility hypothesis.
4  
In this paper we consider an environmental system where many 
agents contribute to the accumulation of a pollutant with global 
characteristics. We analyze cooperative and noncooperative 
solutions under uncertainty which is associated with the process 
of pollution accumulation. We allow for the presence of nonlinear 
feedbacks in the natural system which could result in multiple 
steady state equilibria. The novelty in our approach lies in that: 
(i) we seek to explore situations where there is a potential 
heterogeneity in risk aversion between a regulator, acting as a 
Stackelberg leader that seeks to implement a cooperative solution, 
and individual agents that behave in a noncooperative way; and 
(ii) we analyze the implications of this heterogeneity for 
regulation when nonlinear dynamics could steer the dynamic system 
towards alternative basins of attraction. 
Heterogeneity in risk aversion is a possibility that appears 
once we start considering as a possible way to model uncertainty 
the ideas of the ”least favorable prior” decision theory (Gilboa 
and Schmeilder, 1989) which results in the use of maximin expected 
utility theory. Sims (2001), for example, hints at this 
heterogeneity by indicating that the same maximin criterion should 
not be imposed on private agents and optimizing policy makers.  
In this paper heterogeneity in risk aversion is introduced   5
in the following way. In the cooperative solution, the regulator 
faces Knightian uncertainty which is of the e-contamination type. 
That is, the regulator is uncertainty averse (first-order risk 
averse) while at the noncooperative solution the agents are risk 
averse (second-order risk averse). 
This heterogeneity could be defended along different lines. 
A regulator could face a dynamical system with at least two 
different time scales with unobservables at a slow time scale that 
can cause bifurcations. These unobservable slow moving dynamics 
may or may not be influenced by responses of the regulatees to 
controls chosen by the regulator. In any event, these unobservable 
dynamics can cause flips to undesirable steady states,
5  which hurt 
the regulator's objective. It would be interesting but complex to 
formalize this interaction between time scales, unobservable slow 
moving bifurcational dynamics, multiple stable states in the fast 
moving dynamics and the regulator's information set being coarser 
than the regulatees' information set which influences the dynamics 
that the regulator is attempting to control. In this paper we 
abstract away this complexity by positing that the regulator, a 
Stackelberg leader, views his/her problem as facing a regulatory 
objective that is e-contaminated Knightian. 
In a problem of global pollution a regulator that seeks to 
implement a cooperative solution under uncertainty could face 
divergent beliefs and not consensus, on the part of the agents 
involved in the global problem, regarding the natural structure 
and the dynamics of the system as well as its behavior under 
alternative policy shocks. This however implies that if the   6
regulator can not impose his/her own beliefs, then he/she faces a 
problem of choice under Knightian uncertainty and can be 
considered as uncertainty averse.
6 On the other hand the individual 
agents acting noncooperatively do not need to face divergent 
beliefs; they choose by maximizing subjective expected utility and 
thus can be regarded as risk averse.   
Another line of approach could be to consider the case where 
the regulator's employment contract and its incentive schedule are 
“as if” the regulator gets punished more severely if something 
unusual happens in response to his/her instrument choice than if 
something opposite in sign that is positive happens. To protect 
against this possibility the regulator could operate under the 
“least favorable prior”, implying uncertainty aversion. 
Using an open loop - most rapid approach path (MRAP) concept
7 
as the equilibrium concept for the noncooperative solution, we 
show that the deviation between the cooperative optimal steady 
state (OSS) and the noncooperative OSS can be broken down into two 
components: one which is due to the public bad externality of the 
global pollutant, while the other is due to the heterogeneity in 
risk aversion between the regulator and the agents. The second 
effect can be identified as a precautionary effect. Thus the 
regulatory instrument should account both for the public bad 
externality and the uncertainty aversion effect, which implies 
that under heterogeneity in the type of risk aversion regulation 
is more stringent. We also show that in the presence of multiple 
equilibria, market-based instruments such as taxes or tradable 
permits might have some difficulties in attaining the steady state   7
chosen by the regulator because of hysteresis effects.  
Finally we examine regulation when the regulator faces 
random shocks to the initial values of the regulated system that 
can move the system to an undesired basin of attraction. We derive 
the optimal regulation in a framework where the parameters of the 
e-contamination in Knightian uncertainty are endogenized. Thus, at 
a second level our paper contributes to the literature by having 
the e-contamination parameter and the implied worst case outcome 
derived from the underlying structure of the problem rather than 
imposed in a somewhat ad hoc matter which has been the most common 
way of handling Knightian uncertainty of the e-contamination type. 
2. The Cooperative Solution 
There are  n i ,..., 1 =  players (e.g. countries) that emit 
pollutant  i a  per unit time with global effects. Gross benefits 
from  i a  are  i pa  where  p is some fixed price (small countries, 
small players). The environmental cost of the accumulated 
pollutant for player iis  ( ) . 0 , 0 , > ′ ′ > ′ i i i c c x c  The pollutant 
accumulates according to  
() () +
=
ℜ ⊂ ∈ = + − = ∑ X x x x x f bx a x
n
i
i , 0 ,
1
0 &    (1) 
where  () x f  is a convex-concave function reflecting the 
nonlinearity associated with feedbacks of the natural system. 
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Equation (1) can be written as:  ( ) x f bx x a − + = & . Substituting 
into (2), the problem can be rewritten in the MRAP formulation as: 
() () ( ) []
max
0
0 s.t. max x x dt px x nc x f bx p e
t ≤ ≤ + − − ∫
∞
− ρ
ρ     (3)   8
The cooperative OSS is determined by:  
() ( ) () ( ) [] px x nc x f bx p b x W
x x ρ + − − = max , max    (4) 
The optimality condition is:  
( ) () () x c n x f b p ′ = ′ − + ρ        (5) 
Suppose a solution 
c x to (5) exists. Then the approach to the 
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Given the nonlinearity in transition equation (1), the first-order 
condition (5) might have more than one solution. Brock and 
Starrett (1999) determine conditions under which there are an odd 
number of solutions for (5). Therefore, 
() () []
minimum   local
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This is shown in figure 1. The OSSs are defined by the 





r x x 3 1,  and local minimum is 
c
r x 2. 
[Figure 1] 
If we assume an adjustment mechanism in the neighborhood of 
the OSS of the form  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0 , > ′ − ′ − + = φ ρ φ x c n x f b p x &  
it is clear that since the slope at any equilibrium point 
c x  is 
given by (7), local maxima are locally stable equilibria, while 
local minima are locally unstable. The sign of  ( ) x f ′ ′  depends on 
the curvature of the feedback function  ( ) x f  in the neighborhood of 
an equilibrium point, while  ( ) X x x c ∈ ∀ > ′ ′ 0 . It follows then, 
that some n  exists such that for  n n >  (7) is negative for all 
x. In this case only one globally stable OSS exists. Therefore   9
cooperation of many players acts as a stabilizer and could 
eliminate multiple equilibria. This is shown in figure 1 where the 
m C  curve drawn for  n nm >  intersects R only once at F to define 
a unique OSS. 
  Suppose that the planner managing the cooperative solution 
faces Knightian uncertainty with regard to the parameters of the 
natural system. Assume that the uncertainty for b - that is, 
uncertainty about the self-cleaning process in a shallow lake 
where phosphorus accumulates, or about the CO2 absorption 
capability of oceans - is of the e-contamination type  
() ( ) ( ) B M m em b e e P ∈ + − = , 1  
where b represents a point mass of unity at b and M represents the 
entire set of probability measures with support [b-B,b+B]. 
Following Epstein and Wang (1994, p. 288, equations (2.3.1) and 
(2.3.2)) we shall assume the planner wishes to choose total 
emissions a to maximize  ( ) b x W , . Then the e-contamination MRAP 
problem under Knightian uncertainty is to maximize 
() ( )( ) ( ) [ ] ∫ ∫ + − = dm b x W e x b W e e WdP , inf , 1     (8) 
It can be shown by using the envelope theorem in (4) that 
() b x W ,  is increasing in b. Since M contains all probability 
measures over b values with support [b-B,b+B], then (8) can be 
written as 
() ( )( ) ( ) ∫ − + − = B b x eW b x W e e WdP
x x , , 1 max max    (9) 
The equivalent to optimality condition (5) under Knightian 
uncertainty is 
() () ( ) x c n x f eB b p ′ = ′ − + − ρ       (10) 
By comparing (5) to (10) the following result can be stated.   10
Proposition 1 Under uncertainty aversion the regulator is first-
order risk averse for all the local maxima  ( ) e x
c  of the welfare 












. For proof see Appendix.   
In terms of figure 1 the solution for the first-order risk 
averse regulator is given by the intersections of the U curve with 
the C curve. Local maxima are ( )
c c x x 3 1,  and local minimum is 
c x2. On 
the other hand, the solution for a second order risk averse 
regulator is given by the intersections of the R curve and the C 
curve. The deviations 
c c
r x x 1 1 −  and 
c c
r x x 3 3 −  can be characterized 
as the reductions in the socially-optimal steady state for the 
accumulation of the pollutant due to precautionary effect. 
It can also be noted in the same figure that if e or B are 
sufficiently large such that  ( ) ( ) x f eB b p ′ − + − ρ  shifts further 
down like curve U1 then there is only one globally stable OSS for 
the uncertainty averse regulator, at a. In this case uncertainty 
aversion eliminates multiple equilibria, and directs the system 
towards the smallest concentration of the pollutant. This effect 
is not, however, present when the regulator is second-order risk 
averse. 
3. The Noncooperative Solution 
In the noncooperative case each player (country) i maximizes 
its own payoff given the best response  j a  of the rest of the 
i j ≠  players. Thus in the deterministic case each player solves 
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Because players are symmetric,  i a  is the same for all i. Using the 
MRAP formulation the noncooperative OSS is determined under 
symmetry by  




















− − = ∑
≠
ρ max , max   
and the optimality condition is  
() () () x c x f b p ′ = ′ − + ρ       (12) 
If a solution 
n x  to (12) exists, then the approach to the 
noncooperative locally stable OSS follows a MRAP. Furthermore, as 
in the cooperative case, local maxima are locally stable and local 
minima are locally unstable.  
By comparing (5) to (12) the public bad-type of externality 
characterizing the global pollutant can be easily identified 
through the  ( ) x c n ′  term. Then the well known result that the 
pollutant accumulation at the noncooperative solution exceeds the 
pollutant accumulation at the cooperative solution immediately 
follows. As shown in figure 1, where the two solutions are 
compared, the C curve shifts down to the N curve for the 
noncooperative case, and the solution is determined by the 
intersection of the N curve with the R curve.  
 For  the  noncooperative game, under uncertainty, the solution 
of the e-contaminated problem is characterized by the optimality 
condition ( ) () ( ) x c x f B e b p ′ = ′ − + − ρ 1 . It is clear that if 
1 e e ≠ , that is the e-contamination parameters are different   12
between the players and the regulator, then a new discrepancy is 
introduced because the  () ρ + − eB b p  part of the optimality 
condition will not be the same in the two solutions. Thus the U 
curve is different for the two problems in figure 1, since the e-
contamination parameters are different between the cooperative and 
the noncooperative solutions. 
If the players are risk averse, with  ω e b b + = ~  where ω  is a 
random variable with zero mean and finite variance, then each 
player solves the problem  ( ) ω e b x EW
i
x + , max  with FONC 
( ) () () x c x f b p ′ = ′ − + ρ . 
The deviation between the cooperative and the noncooperative 
solutions, as shown in figure 1 for the two locally stable OSSs, 
is 
c n c n x x x x 1 1 3 3 , − − . This deviation can be broken into two parts 
which can be attributed to two different sources: 
1. The public bad externality PB = ( )
c
r
n x x 1 1 −  or ( )
c
r
n x x 3 3 −  due 
to the shift of the C curve to the N curve. 
2. The uncertainty aversion effect U = ( )
c c
r x x 3 3 −  or ( )
c c
r x x 1 1 −  
due to the shift of the R curve to the U curve. This effect can be 
identified as a precautionary effect stemming from the fact that 
the regulator is uncertainty averse with respect to the values of 
the natural system. 
Under these conditions regulation that seeks to attain the 
socially-optimal outcome, as this outcome is determined under 
uncertainty aversion, should correct not only for the public bad 
externality which is the standard approach in a global pollution 
problem, but also for the uncertainty aversion effect. This effect 
is induced by the fact that while the regulator managing the   13
cooperative solution exhibits first-order risk aversion, the 
individual players determining the noncooperative solution exhibit 
second-order risk aversion. 
4. Regulation 
  Given the discrepancy between the cooperative and the 
noncooperative OSS, the regulator seeks to implement the 
cooperative OSS by introducing a regulatory instrument. Assume 
that the regulator uses a linear tax τ on emissions to implement 
c x . Then ,  using the MRAP formulation, the noncooperative OSS under 
regulation is determined as  















− − − = ∑
≠






ρ τ max , , max  
The FONC imply that the optimal τ should be chosen so that 
() ( ) () () 3 , 1 , implies 0 = = = ′ − ′ − + − i x x x c x f b p
c
i ρ τ  (13) 
The tax impact is determined in the following proposition.  
Proposition 2 Let 
n
i x  be an unregulated noncooperative steady 
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n
i x  is locally stable (local 




i  if 
n
i x  is locally unstable (local 
minimum). For proof see Appendix. 
[Figure 2] 
 Assume  that  the  regulator wants to implement 
c x1 . It is 
clear from (13) that an increase in the tax rate τ will shift the R 
curve defined by () ( ) () x f b p ′ − + − ρ τ  downward. The purpose is to 
shift the R curve downward to  τ R  (Figure 2) so that it intersects 
the N curve at the point E corresponding to 
c x1 . If the initial 
noncooperative steady state was 
n x1 , then the regulator's steady 
state is attained in a straightforward way. The reduction  u x
n
1  is   14
attributed to the correction for the uncertainty aversion effect 
while the reduction 
c ux1  is attributed to the correction for the 
public bad externality. If the initial noncooperative steady state 
was 
n x3 , then there could be complications. The tax should shift 
the R curve sufficiently to eliminate the basin JK that attracts 
the system to 
n x3 . When this basin shrinks to zero, the system is 
attracted to 
c x1 , which is the only stable equilibrium. However, 
if the JK basin is large enough so that when it has been 
eliminated the lower branch of the  τ R  curve intersects the N curve 
to the left of E as does the curve  1 τ R  in figure 2, then the 
system is attracted to a steady state which is below the desired 
one. To bring the system back to E , the tax needs to be reduced 
so that the curve  1 τ R shifts upward to  τ R . The fact that we need to 
raise the tax beyond the desired point and then reduce it is a 
hysteresis effect resulting from the nonlinearity of the 
transition equation of the natural system.
8 This discussion 
suggests that in the presence of hysteresis effects a command-and-
control regulation that sets a nontransferable limit might be more 
effective in implementing the desired steady state. 
4.1 Regulation under Large Rare Shocks 
The above results imply that in the presence of multiple 
locally stable steady states, regulation design depends on the 
specific basin of attraction where the system is slaved. Once the 
regulator knows the basin of attraction of the system, then the 
regulation discussed in the previous sections applies. The 
regulator might however be uncertain of the system's basin of 
attraction. This is because the specific basin of attraction   15
depends on initial conditions which in cases of a natural system 
could very well be subjected to large rare random shocks which can 
move them from one basin of attraction to the other. It is clear 
that optimal regulation should take into account such an event. 
Let q denote the probability that a large shock moves the 
initial value  ()
0 0 x x =  of our system to the high pollutant 
accumulation basin of attraction. In order to expose the effects 
of large rare shocks in a clearer way, assume that B=0 in (9) so 
that there is no uncertainty regarding the natural parameter b of 
the system. Then the optimal regulation problem for the regulator 
is to determine an optimal tax 
* τ  such that  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] τ τ τ
n n x qW x W q 3 1
* 1 max arg + − =     (14) 
() 3 , 1 , = i x
n
i τ  is a solution of (13) and W is defined by (4). 






For proof see Appendix. 
Thus the regulator will react to an increase in the probability 
that a random shock might move the system to a “bad” basin of 
attraction by increasing the optimal tax. 
Problem (14) can be interpreted in a way that is very close 
to the e-contamination formulation of Knightian uncertainty (9) 
with  e q = . In the Knightian formulation (9) the second term has 
been transformed to reflect the worst case scenario which is the 
worst possible value that Nature can choose for b. In (14) the 
worst possible choice of Nature would be to shock the initial 
condition in such a way that the system moves to the high 
pollutant accumulation basin of attraction and converges 
eventually to the high pollutant accumulation steady state 
n x3 .   16
Thus (14) can be regarded as an e-contamination formulation of 
Knightian uncertainty regarding the basin of attraction of the 
system, with the e-contamination parameter being the probability 
that Nature would choose the worst possible case. This way we 
provide a straightforward interpretation of the e-contamination 
parameter. This parameter can even be endogenized if we take into 
account that the probability of the system ending in the high 
pollutant accumulation basin of attraction can be affected by the 
choice of the optimal tax τ . 
Assume that initially the system is in the basin of 
attraction of the low pollutant accumulation steady state. Let the 
timing be such that the regulator chooses τ  and Nature adds a 
random shock. The system will jump to the basin of attraction of 
the high pollutant accumulation steady state if the shock is such 
that the initial value passes to the right of point J in figure 2, 
which is the locally unstable equilibrium that separates the two 
locally stable basins of attraction. However, by setting a tax, 
the regulator affects the position of this basin-separation point, 
since increasing that tax reduces the high pollutant accumulation 
basin of attraction JK. In a situation like this the regulator 
could have two alternative courses of action. One is to choose a 
tax so that the probability of a shock moving the system to a high 
pollutant accumulation basin of attraction is zero. The second is 
to choose the tax by optimally taking into account the effect of 
the tax on the basin separation point. 
To make the probability of the system being shocked to a 
high pollutant accumulation basin of attraction zero, the high   17
pollutant accumulation steady state should be eliminated. This 
means that the tax should be chosen so that curve  1 τ R  in figure 2 
shifts downward until the point where the intersections at J and K 
are eliminated. The following proposition defines this tax. 
Proposition 4 Let τ  be a tax rate such that 
() () () () ( ) ( ) 0 = ′ − ′ − + − τ τ ρ τ x c x f b p  has two solutions:  
() () () ( ) ( )




= ′ ′ + ′ ′
> ′ ′ + ′ ′
τ τ τ
τ τ τ
x c x f p x
x c x f p x
 
Then for any  τ τ >  the high pollutant accumulation basin of 
attraction is eliminated and the regulated system has only one 
steady state with low pollution accumulation.  
For Proof see Appendix. 
The tax rate τ  can be obtained iteratively by gradual 
increases until the point of tangency between the N curve and the 
1 τ R is reached. 
To determine the optimal tax rate by taking into account the 
effect of the tax on the basin separation point let 
() [] z S z FS > = Pr  be the cumulative distribution function of a 
random shock S . If  ( ) τ
n x S x 2
0 < +  where  ( ) τ
n x2  is the locally 
unstable steady state of the regulated system, corresponding to 
point J in figure 2, then the system converges to the locally 
stable low pollutant accumulation steady state  ( ) τ
n x1  corresponding 
to point H in figure 2. If  ( ) τ
n x S x 2
0 > +  then the system 
converges to the locally stable high pollutant accumulation steady 
state  () τ
n x3  corresponding to point K in figure 2. Then the optimal 
taxation problem is defined as  





S x W x F x W x F 3 2 1 2 1 max − +  (15) 
with FONC    18
() ()() () () () () [] () () ( ) ( ) ()
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Comparing (15) to (14) and (9) it is clear that the e-
contamination parameter is now determined by  () ( ) τ
n
S x F 2 1 −  and it 
has been endogenized since the probability that Nature will choose 
the high accumulation basin of attraction depends on the optimal 
tax choice. In (16) it can be seen that in the FONC the first term 
reflects the marginal effect of a tax change on the probability 
that the shock will take the system to the high pollutant 











2 ′  weighted 
by the difference in welfare between the low and the high 
pollutant accumulation which is  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) B b x W b x W
n n − − , , 3 1 τ τ . 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper introduces a new framework of analysis of 
environmental regulation issues, using a non-linear representation 
of the natural system, where there is heterogeneity in risk 
aversion between regulator and regulatees, the regulator being 
first-order risk averse (uncertainty averse) facing Knightian 
uncertainty of the e-contamination type, while the regulatees are 
second-order risk averse. 
  We are able to identify a precautionary effect in addition 
to the public bad externality effect contributing to the deviation 
between cooperative and noncooperative solutions. The 
precautionary effect is induced by risk aversion heterogeneity. 
The first-order risk averse regulator should choose policy 
instruments in a way that allows for both the precautionary effect   19
and the public bad effect. 
 Nonlinearities  and  multiplicity of basins of attraction 
reduce the effectiveness of market-based instruments such as taxes 
or tradable emission permits. Because of an hysteresis effect, the 
achievement of the cooperative solution could require setting 
taxes initially below the optimal level and then changing them to 
move towards their optimal level. 
  Finally we consider regulation under large rare shocks that 
could move the system to an undesirable basin of attraction. In 
this case the regulator can choose taxes optimally by taking into 
account the effects of the tax choice on the probability that the 
system will move to an undesirable basin of attraction. In this 
way we obtain an endogenization of the e-contamination parameter 
of Knightian uncertainty, which is an advance relative to the ad 
hoc way in which this parameter has been chosen up to now. 
  In this paper we examined only one possible combination of 
risk aversion heterogeneity and game form between the regulator 
and the regulatees in a nonlinear system, namely the one in which 
the regulator is first-order risk averse and leads, while the 
regulatees are second-order risk averse and follow. This seems to 
be the most appropriate choice for the specific environmental 
problem. Different types of regulation problems could fit 
different combinations of risk aversion and game forms. This 
implies that our methodological approach, by allowing for 
heterogeneity in risk aversion and nonlinear dynamics, could lead 
to a more realistic analysis of general classes of regulation 
under uncertainty. It should be noticed that the endogenization of   20
the e-contamination parameter of Knightian uncertainty can also be 
used as a general approach for analyzing regulation under rare 
shocks in nonlinear systems.  
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: Taking the total derivative of (10) with 
respect to e we obtain 
() () () () [] ( )
0 < − = ′ ′ + ′ ′ pbB
de
e dx
e x c n e x f p
c
c c    
Since  () ( ) () ( ) 0 > ′ ′ + ′ ′ e x c n e x f p







Consider now a risk averse regulator and a mean preserving 
spread around b, to be  ω e  where ω  is a random variable with zero 
mean and finite variance. The OSS for the regulator is determined 
as the solution of the expected welfare maximization problem 
() ω e b x EW
x + , max  with FONC 
() () ( ) [] ( ) ( ) () . 0 = ′ − ′ − + = ′ − ′ − + + x c n x f b p x c n x f e b p E ρ ρ ω  






 trivially. QED 
Proof of Proposition 2: At a steady state  ( ) 0 > ′ − + x f b ρ  
because  () 0 > ′ x c  in (13). Totally differentiating the FONC we 
obtain  ( )










. Evaluating this in the 




i  if 
n
i x  is 
locally stable (unstable). QED   
Proof of Proposition 3:  The optimal regulation is defined as  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) τ τ τ
τ τ
n n x qW x W q G 3 1 1 max max + − =  with FONC   21
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. At  0 = q  we have, since  ( ) ()
0 ,
















from Proposition 2, that 











x c n x f b p
x
b x W
   (18) 
The existence of a solution for this equation requires, from the 
implicit function theorem, that  ( ) ( ) () ( ) [ ] 0 1 1 ≠ ′ ′ + ′ ′ − τ τ
n n x c n x f p  
which is true for a local maximum. In this case  ( ) . 1
*
1
c n x x = τ  In 
the same way we can prove the existence of a solution for the 
optimal regulation problem for  1 = q  with  ( ) . 3
*
3
c n x x = τ  Using 
(17) we obtain:  










































   





 because: (i) 0 < ττ G  by 
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b x W τ
 because 
() ()
c n n x x x 1
*
1 3 = > τ τ . QED 
Proof of Proposition 4: For  τ τ =  the system has one hyperbolic 
equilibrium point at  () τ 1 x  which is locally stable and a 
nonhyperbolic equilibrium point at  ( ) τ 2 x . The nonhyperbolic point 
is a point of tangency of the N curve with the  1 τ R  curve. For any 
τ τ >  the nonhyperbolic point is eliminated, the  1 τ R  curve shifts 
further to the right and there is only one globally stable point   22
of low pollutant accumulation. QED. 
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